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Anti-realist Epistemologies in Education
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7(1) 46-51

Mark Ortwein
The University of Mississippi
Abstract
Constructivism and postmodernism endorse and anti-realist metaphysics. Once we
abandon the fruitless search for objective reality, so the argument goes, we can devote ourselves to
making our beliefs more efficacious than they were before. We can do this because we have given up
truth-as-correspondence, and have embraced the claim that what makes a belief right is just that
experience has taught us that it works. In short, because our claims to truth (and thus knowledge)
refer to utter contingent accounts of reality, it follows that they are only contextually true. As such,
any claim to an invariant foundation (an objectively knowable external world, for example) for
knowledge is met with skepticism. Instead, knowledge ought to be concerned with the local and
specific (contextual) rather than the context-free and totalizing general.

Introduction
This entry is part of a three-part
series on educational epistemologies.
Some (perhaps many) readers will be
unfamiliar with major philosophers and
theoretical frameworks that speak to these
issues. The primary aim of this project,
however, is situate educational theorizing
and philosophizing within the domain of
contemporary metaphysics and
epistemology. Specifically, it aims to
provide a categorical framework in which
to understand the essential (anti)
metaphysical presuppositions and
attending epistemological commitments
of some the more prominent educational
paradigms. A secondary goal of this
article is to introduce new concepts to
educational scholars, with the hope that
doing so will add a new layer of
understanding the to work of education
scholarship.
Theories and philosophies in
education can be classified in terms of
how they understand the nature of reality
(metaphysics). This turns out to be quite
significant for teachers, as well as the
work of the educational theorist and/or

researcher. For example, if I (an
educational theorist) deny that the
external world exists in some objective
independent state as a constructivist
might, it follows that my knowledgeclaims about this or that educational
phenomenon will be constrained by this
presupposition. It will also have
important implications—as the so-called
paradigm wars in educational research
demonstrate—for the sort of educational
research I carry out. Thus, reckoning with
one’s metaphysical assumptions plays an
important part in the consumption and
production of research (e.g., new
knowledge).
With this in mind, I explore the
first of these metaphysical starting points:
anti-realism. I begin by defining antirealism in terms of two basic premises:
(1) a denial that world exists
independently and objectively outside
human intellection, and (2) the intuition
that our mental activity organizes and
provides meaning to our experiences. I
then trace out the epistemological claims
of two particularly influential anti-realist
frameworks in education: constructivism
and postmodernism.
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The term “anti-realist” is farreaching. One can be an anti-realist about
some or all of the following: physical
entities, morals, the past, the future, other
minds, universals, and so on. Alvin
Plantinga (1982) provides the follow
concise description of anti-realism:

constructivism takes many forms—some
quite radical, others relatively
moderate—it generally denies the
traditional conception of knowledge as
justified true belief. Instead, most
constructivists endorse an explicitly antirealist thesis that (1) knowledge is
constructed by an individual or society,
because (2) there is no shared reality to
which our beliefs about the world
correspond. Put differently, individuals
interpret and give meaning to the world
around them. A socially constructed
reality emerges when persons share their
realities with one another. However, both
(1) and (2) are subject to multiple
interpretations.

The core of…anti-realism is the
idea that objects in the world
owe their fundamental
structure—and, if they couldn’t
exist without displaying that
structure, their existence—to our
creative activity. The world as it
is in itself, apart from this
structuring activity, doesn’t
display any of these features.
The idea is that if there were no
persons (or if there were some
and they didn’t structure the
world in the way in which we do
in fact structure it) then there
would be no objects in space or
time, none displaying object
property structure, no number of
things of any sort, and the like
(p. 50).

Constructivism stresses the
subjective nature of experience and the
vital contribution of the learner and
teacher to the process of acquiring new
knowledge (or making meaning).
Likewise, the products of constructivist
research (e.g., ethnographic research,
self-studies, grounded research) are
recognized and embraced as systematic
subjective representations of reality. A
representation, of course, is not distinct
picture of the world as it is; rather, it is
filtered interpretation of how the world
manifests itself. As such, findings in a
qualitative study might be loosely defined
as “knowledge” insofar as they make
sense of our shared social experiences.
Neither students nor researchers,
however, are gaining new knowledge of
the world “out there.”

Plantinga makes two relevant
observations here: (1) the mind is
responsible for structuring and ordering
experience, and (2) without this mental
activity these objects would have no
fundamental ordering or structure
whatsoever. Each position outlined below
is (according to its own logic) anti-realist;
each is dubious of “objective” knowledge
claims about the actual state-of-affairs
outside the activity of the mind.

In this way, constructivism clearly
parts ways with traditional Anglo/analytic
accounts of knowledge as justified true
belief. The crux of the issue lies most
centrally in the particular account of truth
posited by constructivists. Metaphysical
realists understand truth as a

Constructivism
Perhaps the most influential
theory of learning in education these days
is constructivism. Although
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correspondence relationship between a
mind and world: through our perceptual
faculties we perceive the world around us
and can then make certain justified claims
about it. A true belief, on this account, is
one in which a proposition (a statement of
fact) matches reality. Anti-realists would
counter that we have little reason to
believe our minds have access to such a
reality. It follows that truth claims gain
no force by appealing to the external
world as it really is. The upshot is that
constructivists must reject the traditional
articulation of knowledge as justified true
belief.

In Democracy and Education,
Dewey (1922) writes, “In schools, those
under instruction are too customarily
looked upon as acquiring knowledge as
theoretical spectators, minds which
appropriate knowledge by direct energy of
intellect. The very word pupil has almost
come to mean one who is engaged not in
having fruitful experiences but in
absorbing knowledge directly. Something
which is called mind or consciousness is
severed from the physical organs of
activity” (p. 164). Dewey, like
constructivists, views the acquisition of
knowledge as a constructive and ongoing
process. One does not simply learn, but
one is always learning.

Several important figures in the
history of education have endorsed or
been associated a variety of moderate
forms of constructivism, e.g., Jean Piaget
(1954), Jerome Bruner (1973), and Lev
Vygotsky (1978). Names most educators
will certainly recognize. Piaget, for
example, argued that knowledge is
internalized by way of assimilation and
accommodation (cognitive
constructivism). Assimilation refers to the
process whereby new experiences are
integrated into our existing knowledge
framework. Suppose I read a novel by
Tolstoy. As I work through the text, I
encounter new ideas and interesting
passages. These are assimilated into my
pre-existing network of knowledge. My
mind then takes a further step to
accommodate this new knowledge. Thus,
accommodation is a re-framing of my
mental representations of the external
world. It follows that one’s mind is
always in the process of changing. Here
we see the influence of John Dewey’s
pragmatic philosophy of education on
constructivist (and postmodern) theories
of knowledge construction.

Postmodernism
Postmodernism, often used
interchangeably with poststructuralism
and methodologically tied to
deconstructionism, is another anti-realist
theory that has garnered considerable
attention in education over the past few
decades. Two often cited contemporary
curriculum theorists—Patrick Slattery
(2006) and William Doll (1993)—have
endorsed poststructural approaches as
modes of inquiry that open new
possibilities for understanding the
present-day educational landscape. Doll,
for example, predicts that a “new sense of
educational order will emerge, as will
new relations between teachers and
students, culminating in a new concept of
curriculum” (p. 3). Doll’s prediction,
made in 1993, may well have come to
fruition within the context of curriculum
scholarship. New curricular models and
frameworks inspired by postmodern
thought continue to find purchase in
educational thinking.
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Offering a concise definition of
postmodernism, however, tends to be
difficult. According to Usher and
Edwards (1994), “There is a sense,
anyhow, in which it is impossible to fully
define the postmodern since the very
attempt to do so confers upon it a status
and identity which it must necessarily
oppose.” Rather, the terms postmodern,
postmodernism, and postmodernity are
“loose umbrella term[s] under whose
broad cover can be encompassed at one
and the same time a condition, a set of
practices, a cultural discourse, an attitude
and a mode of analysis” (p. 7). In short,
to systematize postmodernism is to miss
the point of postmodernism. Thus, the
following analysis aims only at
approximation—fully aware that
codification reifies exactly that which
postmodernity repudiates. Nevertheless,
if, as its advocates maintain,
postmodernism is a new way of thinking
about education, what does it have to say
about knowledge?

postmodernism. Patrick Slattery describes
his own constructive approach that “seeks
to integrate the best features of
premodern rural, agrarian societies (such
as spirituality, cosmology, and
family/tribal community values) in order
to construct a more balanced and
ecologically sustainable global
community” (p. 28). And still others
address educational issues through a
postmodern reading of scientific
development (Tobin, 1993). Likewise,
others have focused their attentions on
ecological issues. Chet bowers (1993), for
example, works to create a postmodern
theory of ecological justice rooted in a
sense of generational and biotic
connectedness. I sum, there are
innumerable positions available to the
postmodern theorist. What binds many of
them together is a strong sense of justice:
ecological justice, economic justice, and
social justice.
At root postmodernism is deeply
suspicious of so-called modernist meta or
grand narratives about knowing and
knowledge. It is argued that these
narratives describe or frame the world in
a fixed language that simply cannot
represent the shifting nature of reality.
Instead, postmodern thought starts with
the assumption that the structures,
systems, and relationships that underpin
modernist accounts of reality are wholly
contingent and fluid. Richard Rorty
(1999), for example, presents a
postmodern theory of knowledge that
denies that we have direct access to
reality—that is, the way things are
independent of the mind. Rather, he
argues that knowledge (and epistemology)
ought to be replaced with “hope” in better
ways of believing. He warns, "One should
stop worrying about whether what one
believes is well grounded and start

There are, of course, numerous
postmodern perspectives in educational
theory. Patti Lather (1992) argues for
deconstruction when approaching
educational issues and research.
According to Lather, the goal of
deconstruction “is to keep things in
process, to disrupt, to keep the system in
play, to set up procedures to continuously
demystify the realities we create, to fight
the tendency for our categories to
congeal” (p. 96). Knowledge is thus
unmoored from any objective (static or
fixed) external state of affairs—any
singular account of reality. Many, if not
all, postmodernists would agree with
Lather’s insistence that we deconstruct
the binaries and categories that permeate
education. Nevertheless, some have
called for “constructive” elements in
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worrying about whether one has been
imaginative enough to think up interesting
alternatives to one's present beliefs" (p.
34).

Likewise, creators of new
knowledge (researchers) would do well to
consider the epistemological foundations
of constructivism and postmodernism.
Having discussed these issues with my
university colleagues, I have observed that
relatively few professors of education have
given much attention to the
epistemological and metaphysical
implications of anti-realist theories. The
reason is relatively simple. Few faculty
members have extensive background in
philosophy, which explains the relative
lack of theoretical sophistication when
dealing with epistemological claims. One
remedy I strongly advocate is the inclusion
of two required doctoral-level courses in
philosophy of education and educational
epistemology. The former would provide a
general overview of the major
philosophical movements that have
influenced the trajectory of contemporary
schooling, while the latter provide a space
for doctoral students to work through their
personal epistemological worldview. The
upshot is that greater understanding of
these issues would not only improve future
academicians’ understanding, but would
also translate into higher quality work.

Discussion: The Upshot
The preceding accounts of
constructivism and postmodernism are
significant for teachers and educational
researchers on several fronts. To begin
with, I would argue that purveyors of
knowledge (teachers) ought to have a
strong grasp of what it is they are up to.
When a teacher gives a lecture on the
process of photosynthesis, for example, is
she sharing something true and
incontrovertible about the world as it is, or
should she understand her lectures as
representing something contingent and
socially constructed? Constructivist
thinkers are quite right to emphasize the
importance of meaning making and
personal learning schemes, especially if
organizing the content of experience is so
deeply embedded in learners’ mental
activity.
Suppose, however, an educator has
concluded that constructivist and/or
postmodern epistemology has missed the
mark. Given constructivism’s expressed
relativism and postmodernism’s
political/ideological leanings, it is not
difficult to image some students rejecting
their essential epistemological claims in
favor of theories that endorse an
objectively knowable world
(epistemological realism). What practical
implications would this have on her
instructional practices? Do the best
practices of constructivism conflict with
realism? Such questions ought to occupy
a central place in the academic training of
teachers in teacher education programs.
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